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ABSTRACT 
In its Airfreight decision, the European Commission (Commission) fined eleven airlines 
approximately €799 million for their participation in a price-fixing cartel.1 This decision is of 
particular interest because the Commission awarded all carriers a “reduction of 15% on account 
of the general regulatory environment in the sector[,] which can be seen as encouraging price co-
ordination.”2 
Airlines alleged on appeal that, with regard to certain routes involving third country 
destinations, the regulatory environment did not simply encourage the prohibited behavior, but 
rather imposed this behavior on the airlines.3 If this ground for appeal succeeds, it would mean 
that the alleged collusion with regard to those routes did not constitute an infringement of Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) at all.4 
This article first analyzes past reductions in fines under this category of mitigation and then 
discusses the “general regulatory environment” that may have led to the reduction in this case. 
Since the Commission and the European courts take a robust attitude in this area, the 
Commission’s concession of a 15% reduction in fines is particularly noteworthy. The article 
concludes by considering the strength of the airlines’ grounds for appeal based on evidence of 
the “general regulatory environment.” 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Commission’s discretion when imposing fines for breaches of the European Union (EU) 
competition rules has been a topical and contentious issue in recent years; in the Airfreight 
decision, the Commission exercised its discretion to reduce the fine on all participants due to the 
“general regulatory environment.”5 This rationale seems to be a novel application of one of the 
 
1 Case COMP/39258, Commission Decision of Sept. 11, 2010 (unpublished). While a public 
version of the Airfreight case is not yet available, the Commission has published a detailed press 
release that enumerates the various infringements, the breakdown of fines as notified to each air 
cargo carrier, and the relevant adjustments as calculated with or without reference to leniency 
policies or the exercise of discretion. See Press Release, Eur. Union Comm’n, Antitrust: 
Commission Fines 11 Air Cargo Carriers €799 Million in Price Fixing Cartel (Nov. 9, 2010), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1487_en.htm [hereinafter Airfreight Press 
Release]. 
2 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
3 Id. 
4 See id.; Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty), Europa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26092_en.htm (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
5 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
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established grounds for mitigation when setting fines for infringement of the competition rules. 
On the one hand, this raises questions as to the Commission’s breadth of discretion in setting 
fines because under this head of mitigation, the Commission has set its own benchmarks as to 
what degree of mitigation is appropriate, with little evidence of how it arrives at a particular 
figure and with the courts maintaining a deferential approach to review.6 On the other hand, this 
mitigation adds a new dimension to the already occasional “special treatment” of some practices 
in the aviation sector by competition authorities.7 
In the Airfreight case, the Commission also exercised its usual “powers” of leniency and 
recidivism uplift.8 The whistle-blower, Lufthansa and subsidiary Swiss International Airlines, 
received full immunity under the Commission Leniency Programme,9 whereas the fine for SAS, 
the Scandinavian carrier, was increased by 50% for its previous infringement in SAS/Maersk 
Air.10 
At the same time, the Commission exercised its discretion to reduce the fines.11 On the basis of 
the one-way nature of air cargo shipments, all carriers were given a 50% reduction to take 
account of sales on routes where the harm of the cartel fell outside the European Economic Area 
(EEA).12 Additionally, the Commission granted all the carriers a reduction of 15% “on account 
of the general regulatory environment in the sector[,] which can be seen as encouraging price co-
ordination.”13 
The operation of the cargo and passenger airline industries raises particular problems for the 
application of competition laws because a high degree of coordination between competing 
 
6 See, e.g., Case T-348/08, Aragonesas Industrias y Enegia, SUA v. Comm’n, 2011 E.C.R. 
11-7583. 
7 See Aviation, Transport & Env’t, http://www.transportenvironment.org/what-we-
do/aviation (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); David Gow, EU Proposes Crackdown on Airlines’ 
Hidden Charges, Guardian (July 17, 2006), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/jul/18/travel.money. 
8 See Leniency, Eur. Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
9 British Airways has appealed, inter alia, on the ground that it was given the lowest fine 
reduction under the Leniency Programme despite being the first to come forward. Airfreight 
Press Release, supra note 1. 
10 Commission Decision (EC) No. 716/2001 of 18 July 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 265) 15, aff’d, 
Case T-241/01, Scandinavian Airlines Sys. AB v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-2917. It is 
interesting that the recidivist uplift was applied although the earlier infringement was for market 
sharing. 
11 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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carriers is a requisite for the efficient functioning of the sector.14 In the past, international 
agreements between third countries and EU Member States have been annulled on the grounds of 
(indirect) infringement of EU law.15 At the same time, the Commission enacted a number of 
sector-specific block exemptions to the competition rules, which were in operation between 
199316 and 2007,17 permitting consultation and agreement between airlines on tariffs. 
The factors in the regulatory environment that led the Commission to grant a 15% reduction 
are unknown because a public version18 of the Airfreight decision is not yet available;19 however, 
 
14 See generally Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 18. 
15 The most notable instances were agreements concluded by Sweden, Finland, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the U.K. with third countries following the 
Second World War, which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed 
infringed upon EU law in two respects: (1) nationality clauses infringed the right of European 
airlines to nondiscriminatory market access to routes between all Member States and third 
countries; and (2) only the EU has the authority to agree to this type of commitment where 
agreements affect the exercise of EU competence. See Joined Cases C-466/98, C-467/98, C-
468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-475/98 & C-476/98, Comm’n v. U.K., 2002 E.C.R. I-
9427; Council Regulation 847/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 7, 8. Infringement procedures are 
ongoing against twelve Member States. See Press Release, European Union Comm’n, Air 
Transport: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures Against France, Germany, Austria, 
and Finland over Agreements with Russia on Siberian Overflights (Oct. 28, 2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1425_ga.htm; Press Release, European Union 
Comm’n, Air Transport: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures Against Seven 
Member States over Agreements with Russia on Siberian Overflights (Jan. 27, 2011), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-74_en.htm?locale=en. 
16 Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 14. 
17 The Commission elected not to renew the block exemptions, which expired in June 2007 for 
routes between the EU and the United States or Australia, and in October 2007 for routes 
between the EU and other third countries. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Competition: 
Commission Ends Block Exemption for IATA Passenger Tariff Conferences for Routes Between 
the EU and Non-EU Countries (June 29, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-07-973_en.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Commission Ends Block Exemption]. The 
International Aviation Transportation Association (IATA) and individual carriers have been 
required since then to ensure that their agreements are compatible with the general EU 
competition rules. Id. 
18 Gaining access to the Commission’s file is often a difficult undertaking. See, e.g., Case C-
404/10 P–Commission v. Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, InfoCuria, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-404/10%20P (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013); C-477/10 P–Commission v. Agrofert, A.S., InfoCuria, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-477/10%20P (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013); Case C-360/09–Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, InfoCuria, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-360/09 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
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this article attempts to give an account of the “general regulatory environment” within which the 
sector operates before suggesting how it might encourage price coordination. 
Particular air transport agreements between EU Member States and third countries, which 
appear to be the bases of some airlines’ appeals, are examined in this article. A number of 
appeals allege that the prohibited behavior was not simply encouraged by the regulatory 
environment but was actually imposed on the airlines.20 If this ground for appeal succeeds, it 
would not bring about the reduction of fines, but it would result in the annulment of the relevant 
part of Commission’s decision—Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU do not apply where “anti-
competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation,” or where the national 
legal framework “eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part.”21 
This article first considers the “general regulatory environment” of the sector through an 
investigation of its sources before turning to consider how this could encourage price 
coordination. A semi-historical examination of the applicability and application of the EU 
competition rules to air transport reveals particular characteristics of the air transport sector that 
led to the issuance of sector-specific block exemptions permitting the sharing of information 
about price and other types of cooperation that are otherwise illegal under Article 101(1) of the 
TFEU.22 While all the block exemptions are now repealed, in the Airfreight case, the “general 
regulatory environment” in which carriers operated mitigated the penalties imposed for what was 
a hard-core price-fixing cartel, described as “deplorable” by Vice President for Competition 
Joaquín Almunia.23 
 
19 It is not uncommon that evidence produced pursuant to cartel investigations carried out by 
the Commission later becomes available via civil discovery in the United States. See Samuel R. 
Miller et al., U.S. Discovery of European Union and U.S. Leniency Applications and Other 
Confidential Investigatory Materials, 3 CPI Antitrust J., Mar. 16, 2010, at 2. It may be argued 
that the risk that information held in the Commission’s file on Airfreight would be used in future 
proceedings against the relevant air cargo carriers in jurisdictions outside the EU outweighs the 
benefits of declassifying such information. This article proceeds on the basis that it is unlikely 
that a comprehensive, final version of the Commission’s decision will be made available to the 
public—at least until global cartel investigations, proceedings, and appeals have been concluded 
in the multiple jurisdictions where these actions continue. 
20 Joined Cases C-359 & C-379/95 P, Comm’n v. Ladbroke Racing, 1997 E.C.R. I-6265, 
6305. 
21 Id. 
22 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101(1), 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 88 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
23 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
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II.  THE DECISION 
In November 2010, the Commission fined eleven air cargo carriers approximately €799 
million for “operating a worldwide cartel which affected cargo services within the [EEA].”24 The 
carriers fined were Air Canada, Air France-KLM, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Cargolux, 
Japan Airlines, LAN Chile, Martinair, Qantas, SAS, and Singapore Airlines.25 The cartel was in 
operation for six years, from December 1999 to February 14, 2006.26 According to the 
Commission, the cartel was arranged through “numerous contacts between airlines, at both [the] 
bilateral and multilateral level,” covering flights to, from, and within the EEA.27 
In most cases, the air cargo carriers fined in Europe also received fines in other jurisdictions 
for the same offense and on similar facts. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
fined a total of twenty-one airlines more than $1.7 billion in criminal fines and filed criminal 
charges against nineteen executives in an ongoing investigation into fixing cargo rates—a so-
called “conspiracy to restrain trade” in the air cargo transportation services sector of the air 
transport industry.28 To date, four executives have been sentenced under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act to serve time in prison, while charges are pending against an additional three air 
cargo executives.29 Two recent plea agreements in the U.S. investigation include Singapore 
Airlines Cargo PTE Ltd. and Cargolux; both have agreed to pay criminal fines of $48 million30 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Alicia A. Caldwell, 21 Airlines Fined for Fixing Passengers, Cargo Fees, Wash. Post (Mar. 
5, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/05/AR2011030501365.html. 
29 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). A breach of U.S. antitrust law carries a maximum 
penalty of ten years in prison and a fine of $1 million for an individual, and carries a maximum 
fine of $10 million for corporations for offenses committed before June 22, 2004, or $100 
million for offenses committed thereafter. Id. This “may be increased to twice the gain derived 
from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is 
greater than the statutory maximum fine.” Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Polar Air Cargo LLC 
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Air Cargo Shipments: Company Agrees to Pay $17.4 
Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/262145.htm.  
30 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE Ltd Agrees to Plead Guilty 
to Price Fixing on Air Cargo Shipments: Company Agrees to Pay $48 Million Criminal Fine 
(Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/264634.htm. 
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and $119 million,31 respectively. Singapore Airlines Cargo was also fined $3.3 million by the 
Competition Commission of South Africa for its involvement in the same worldwide cartel.32 
In the Airfreight case, the Commission found that the air cargo carriers had contacted each 
other to ensure that all worldwide freight carriers would introduce a flat-rate fuel surcharge per 
kilo of cargo (price-fixing).33 The carriers “extended their cooperation by introducing a security 
surcharge and refusing to pay a commission on [these] surcharges to their clients (freight 
forwarders).”34 The Commission stated that “[b]y refusing to pay a commission, the airlines 
ensured that surcharges did not become subject to competition through the granting of discounts 
to customers.”35 
By agreeing between themselves to pass on the fuel and security surcharges in full and without 
any discount to the freight forwarders, the airline companies ensured that the freight forwarders 
could not exert competitive pressure on the airlines to reduce their prices.36 
A.  Setting the Fine 
The legal basis of the Commission’s “power” to impose fines on undertakings in breach of EU 
competition law is Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003,37 which replaced Regulation 17/62.38 
While Article 23(2)(c) stipulates that “the fine shall not exceed 10% of [an undertaking’s] total 
turnover in the preceding business year,” and Article 23(3) stipulates that “[i]n fixing the amount 
of the fine,39 regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement,” 
 
31 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Cargolux Airlines International Airlines Executives Plead 
Guilty for Fixing Surcharge Rates on Air Cargo Shipments: Airline Executives to Serve Prison 
Time (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/278133.htm. 
32 Harry Suhartono, Singapore Airlines Pays $3.3 Million Fine to S. Africa, Reuters (Mar. 26, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-singaporeairlines-southafrica-
idUSBRE82Q01E20120327. 
33 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 According to the Commission, there were four price-fixing cartels between (1) Europe and 
the rest of the world; (2) Europe and the United States; (3) Europe and China; and (4) Europe 
and Hong Kong. See Press Release, European Union Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Imposes 
€169 Million Fine on Freight Forwarders for Operating Four Price Fixing Cartels (Mar. 28, 
2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-314_en.htm. The Commission 
additionally fined fourteen international freight forwarding companies €169 million for their 
collusion on prices on these important international trade lines. Id. 
37 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 17. 
38 Council Regulation 17/62, art. 15, 1959–1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87, 91–92. 
39 Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 37, art. 23. 
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within that limitation the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confirmed that the 
Commission enjoys a very broad discretion with respect to the setting of fines in particular 
cases.40 Regulation 1/2003 makes clear that fining decisions may be imposed both for intentional 
and negligent infringements.41 
Though the Commission did not originally set out criteria for the imposition of fines, the level 
at which fines were set in earlier years was significantly lower than today.42 There were also far 
fewer decisions on cartel infringement; approximately one cartel was uncovered each year 
between 1959 and 1998.43 At the same time, the Commission’s wide discretion in imposing fines 
was upheld by the CJEU: “the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs 
of [EU competition] policy.”44 
The level of fines imposed for breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU rose steeply 
from the mid-1980s onward.45 In 1998, the Commission, prodded by the concern of the Court of 
First Instance (CFI; now the General Court), decided that its fining criteria should be more 
transparent46 and adopted the 1998 Guidelines on the Setting of Fines (1998 Guidelines).47 Under 
the 1998 Guidelines, the basic fine amount was calculated according to gravity and duration by 
first classifying the infringement as “minor,” “serious,” or “very serious,” depending on a 
number of factors.48 A multiplier was applied for duration: 10% per annum or 50% added for 
cartels subsisting for five or more years.49 Then, a number of “aggravating” or “mitigating” 
factors were applied, resulting in a lower or higher fine.50 
 
40 Joined Cases 100-103/80, Musique Diffusion Française SA v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 1825, 
1926; Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation 1/2003, ¶ 2, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2 [hereinafter 2006 Guidelines]. 
41 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 1. 
42 Alan Riley, The Modernisation of EU Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Will the Commission 
Grasp the Opportunity?, 31(5) E.C.L.R. 191, 192 (2010). 
43 Id. 
44 Musique Diffusion Française SA, 1983 E.C.R. at 1906. 
45 Riley, supra note 41, at 192–93. 
46 Case T-148/89, Tréfilunion v. Commission (Welded Steel Mesh), 1995 E.C.R. II-1063, 
1119, ¶ 142 (“[T]he Court considers that . . . it is desirable for undertakings—in order to be able 
to define their position in full knowledge of the facts—to be able to determine in detail, in 
accordance with any system which the Commission might consider appropriate, the method of 
calculation of the fine imposed upon them, without being obliged, in order to do so, to bring 
court proceedings against the Commission decision.”). 
47 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation 
No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, 1998 O.J. (C 9) 3–4 [hereinafter 1998 Guidelines]. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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This methodology was refined in the Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed 
Pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 (2006 Guidelines).51 In the process of setting the 
fine, the Commission first determines a basic amount for the fine.52 This is based on a percentage 
of the value of the undertaking’s sales of affected goods or services within the EEA53—a value 
that is “determined before [value added tax (VAT)] and other taxes directly related to the 
sales”—and is usually calculated with reference to the “last full business year of its participation 
in the infringement.”54 The percentage applied in any case is generally up to 30% of the value of 
sales, and the actual percentage used is determined by the gravity of the infringement; the gravity 
of the infringement is assessed by taking into consideration factors such as the combined market 
share of all the undertakings concerned, the geographic scope of the infringement, and the nature 
of the infringement.55 Hard-core cartels, such as agreements for horizontal price-fixing, market-
sharing, and output-limitation,56 are set at the higher end of the scale.57 An innovation introduced 
by the 2006 Guidelines was the possibility that, for worldwide cartels, the undertaking’s share of 
the total value of sales, including sales outside the EEA, could be taken into account, and then 
that percentage share could be applied to the value of the EEA sales when determining the fine 
for each participant.58 
The amount arrived at once the percentage of the value of affected sales has been calculated is 
then multiplied by the number of years the infringement continued.59 This represents a significant 
increase from the 10% per annum rate of the earlier regime.60 An “entry” deterrent of between 
15% and 25% of the value of sales as defined above is then added to the basic amount “to deter 
undertakings from even entering into horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-
limitation agreements.”61 This is applied irrespective of duration.62 
Once the basic amount has been calculated in this way, aggravating or mitigating factors may 
increase or decrease the fine levied.63 A highly significant aggravating factor is recidivism;64 
 
51 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 3. 
52 Id. ¶ 10. 
53 Id. ¶ 13. 
54 Id. ¶¶ 13, 17 (The fine notice will normally refer to “the sales made by the undertaking 
during the last full business year of its participation in the infringement.”). 
55 Id. ¶¶ 19, 21–22. 
56 Id. ¶ 23. 
57 Id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
58 Id. ¶ 18. 
59 Id. ¶ 24. 
60 See id.; 1998 Guidelines, supra note 47, at 3. 
61 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 25. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. ¶¶ 27–29. 
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repeat offenders may be fined an additional 100% for each subsequent “similar” infringement 
(up from the 50% maximum under the 1998 Guidelines), reflecting the view of the CFI in 
Michelin that “[r]ecidivism is a circumstance which justifies a significant increase in the basic 
amount of the fine. Recidivism constitutes proof that the sanction previously imposed was not 
sufficiently deterrent.”65 
In an analysis of thirteen decision made under the 2006 Guidelines, compared with a large 
sample of decisions between 1999 and 2009 under the 1998 Guidelines, Professor John M. 
Connor concludes that there was a 141% increase in the average amount of fines.66 He concludes 
that this was partly due to an increase in average affected sales, but also due to the tougher 
regime introduced by the new guidelines.67 
It has been calculated that fines for hard-core cartel offenses were twenty-nine times higher by 
the end of 2008 than in 1990.68 The steep rise in the level of fines imposed for breaches of 
Article 101 of the TFEU in the past two decades is shown in the following chart69: 
[INSERT GRAPH HERE] 
The total amount imposed in fines for cartels from 2008 to 2012 was approximately €9.16 
billion, with Saint Gobain (car glass) coming in with the highest fine for a single undertaking for 
a cartel infringement at €880 million.70 The Airfreight fine of approximately €799.45 million is 
the fourth highest total for one cartel.71 
The Commission has, as shown above, provided a framework for the calculation of fines in the 
2006 Guidelines.72 The question of whether the legal basis of the fines complies with Article 7 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights73 (ECHR) continues to be raised.74 The recidivism 
uplift, for example, was increased from a maximum of 50% in the 1998 Guidelines to 100% in 
 
64 Id. ¶ 28. 
65 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, 4179, ¶ 293. 
66 John M. Connor, Has the European Commission Become More Severe in Punishing 
Cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines, 32(1) E.C.L.R. 27, 29 (2011). 
67 Id. 
68 John M. Connor & Douglas J. Miller, The Predictability of Global Cartel Fines, 2 
Concurrences: Rev. of Competition L. (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610284 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
69 Cartel Statistics, Eur. Union Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 3. 
73 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
7, Nov. 4, 1950, 2013 U.N.T.S. 222. 
74 See, e.g., In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2010 WL 1634901, at 86 (F.T.C. Apr. 12, 2010).  
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the 2006 Guidelines for each additional infringement.75 This was decided not on the basis of EU 
legislation, as there is no explicit reference to a recidivism penalty in Regulation 1/2003,76 but by 
the Commission itself without debate in any other EU institution.77 Professor Alan Riley, among 
many other commentators, raises the question as to “whether containing such sanctions in an 
administrative document that can be changed at will by the executive without legislation 
complies with [Article] 7” of the ECHR.78 
This argument not been upheld by the European courts so far.79 However, the General Court 
has held that the 2006 Guidelines are “rules of practice from which the administration may not 
depart in an individual case without giving reasons.”80 Furthermore, by adopting and publishing 
these rules of conduct, the Commission has imposed “a limit on the exercise of its discretion”; 
departing from them could breach the general principles of law, such as the right to equal 
treatment and the protection of legitimate expectations.81 Such rules of conduct “may produce 
legal effects.”82 
While the application of the uplift for recidivism has a defined maximum value in the 2006 
Guidelines,83 there is no indication of what percentage increase or decrease might be applied for 
the other aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the 2006 Guidelines, the evaluation of 
which is apparently for the Commission to determine on a case-by-case basis.84 
The other aggravating factors listed that may increase the fine include: refusal to cooperate 
with or obstruction of the Commission in carrying out its investigations; having the “role of 
leader in, or instigator of, the infringement”; attempting “to coerce other undertakings to 
participate”; and taking “any retaliatory measures . . . against other undertakings with a view to 
enforc[e] the practices constituting the infringement.”85 
On the other hand, a number of mitigating circumstances may lower the fine.86 One example is 
when an undertaking provides evidence that its involvement in the infringement was 
 
75 Cento Veljanouski, Deterrence, Recidivism, and European Cartel Fines, 7(4) J. 
Competition L. & Econ. 871, 889 (2011). 
76 See generally Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 37. 
77 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶¶ 1, 28. 
78 Riley, supra note 42, at 204 n.83. 
79 Joined Cases T-69/04, Schunk GmbH v. Commission, 2008 E.C.R. II-2567, ¶ 33. 
80 Joined Cases C-189/02 P, 202/02 P, C-205–208/02 P & C-213/02 P, Dansk Rorindustri v. 
Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. I-542S, ¶¶ 209, 211. 
81 Id. ¶ 211. 
82 Id. 
83 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 28. 
84 Id. ¶¶ 28–29. 
85 Id. ¶ 28. 
86 Id. ¶ 29. 
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substantially limited, or that the anti-competitive conduct of the undertaking has been authorized 
or encouraged by public authorities or legislation—this is the focus of the discussion in this 
article.87 
It should be borne in mind that there are additional factors referred to in the 2006 Guidelines 
that may affect the fine, such as the inability of the firm to pay in a specific social and economic 
context,88 and the application of the “Leniency Programme.”89 Both of these factors were applied 
in the Airfreight case.90 
The high fines imposed in the Airfreight case had a particularly significant impact because the 
decision was delivered at a time when airline companies were under extreme economic and 
competitive pressure. Controversially, the Commission dropped charges against eleven other 
carriers named in the original Statement of Objections.91 
 
87 Id. Other factors are 
where the undertaking concerned provides evidence that it terminated the infringement 
as soon as the Commission intervened: this will not apply to secret agreements or 
practices (in particular, cartels); where the undertaking provides evidence that the 
infringement has been committed as a result of negligence; where the undertaking 
provides evidence that its involvement in the infringement is substantially limited and 
thus demonstrates that, during the period in which it was party to the offending 
agreement, it actually avoided applying it by adopting competitive conduct in the 
market . . . [; and] where the undertaking concerned has effectively cooperated with 
the Commission outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and beyond its legal 
obligation to do so. 
Id. 
88 Id. ¶ 35. 
89 Id. ¶ 34. In 1996, the Commission adopted a “Leniency Notice” that set out the 
Commission’s policy giving immunity or reduced fines to companies that came forward with 
information about cartels. Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in 
Cartel Cases, 1996 O.J. (C 207) 4, 4. The Notice was revised in 2002 and again in 2006. 
Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002 O.J. 
(C 45) 3, 3; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 
2006 O.J. (C 298) 17, 22 [hereinafter 2006 Leniency Notice]. The 2006 Leniency Notice gives 
complete immunity from fines to the first member of a cartel to provide the Commission with 
sufficient “information and evidence” to enable it to launch targeted inspections (dawn raids) on 
other cartel members. 2006 Leniency Notice, supra, at 17–18. A cartel member may also qualify 
for full immunity by providing sufficient information and evidence to establish an infringement 
related to the alleged cartel, but this is only possible if no undertaking has qualified for immunity 
by the first route. Id. at 18. Other undertakings may qualify for a reduction in fines by providing 
evidence that contributes “significant added value” to the investigation. Id. at 20. 
90 See Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
91 Id. 
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B.  Final Reduction: The General Regulatory Environment 
This section of the article focuses on the uniqueness of the 15% reduction granted to all the 
participants in the Airfreight cartel because of the “general regulatory environment” that possibly 
encouraged price coordination.92 
As described above, the 2006 Guidelines provide that the Commission may reduce the basic 
amount of the fine where specified mitigating circumstances exist. One circumstance is “where 
the anti-competitive conduct of the undertaking has been authorized or encouraged by public 
authorities or by legislation.”93 This ground of mitigation was not included in the 1998 
Guidelines, but a fine reduction was given in a number of cases prior to 2006 because the 
condemned behavior was encouraged or authorized by national authorities.94 
This possibility of mitigation of penalties was first raised in the early case of Suiker Unie v. 
Commission, where the CJEU recognized that the “organization of the market in sugar . . . only 
left a residual field available for competition,” and that this contributed to the fact that the sugar 
producers behaved in an anti-competitive manner.95 The CJEU clarified that although the 
structure of the market could not lead to the condoning or acceptance of anti-competitive 
practices, it did mean “that the [behavior] of the parties concerned cannot be regarded with the 
usual severity.”96 For this reason, inter alia, the fines were reduced.97 
The Commission applied such mitigation in the French Beef decision in August 2003.98 In 
French Beef, the parties argued that the intervention of the French authorities (in encouraging the 
conclusion of the prohibited agreement) meant that Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (TEC) (Article 101 of the TFEU) was inapplicable. This argument was 
rejected.99 However, the Commission agreed “that the French State, through its Minister for 
Agriculture, was indeed implicated in the conclusion of the agreement . . . [and] strongly 
encouraged the conclusion of an agreement whose content was necessarily going to be in 
violation of the competition rules.”100 The Commission therefore awarded mitigation (a reduction 
of 30% of their fine) to the two affected trade associations, which refused to sign the agreement 
before “the forceful intervention of the French Minister for Agriculture in [favor] of the 
 
92 Id. 
93 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 29. 
94 See Commission Decision, French Beef, 2003 O.J. (L 209) 12, 39 [hereinafter French Beef 
Decision]. 
95 Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, ¶ 619. 
96 Id. ¶ 620. 
97 See id. ¶ 624. 
98 See French Beef Decision, supra note 94, at 40. 
99 Id. at 36. 
100 Id. 
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conclusion of such an agreement.”101 
In Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF), a judgment102 delivered just before French Beef in 
September 2003, the CJEU clarified the distinction between the situation where the “conduct 
[was] required . . . by national legislation”103 (so that the undertakings were required to act in the 
way that they did, in which case Articles 101 or 102 of the TFEU would not be applicable104) and 
the situation where “the conduct was merely facilitated or encouraged by the national 
legislation” (which would result in a reduction of the fines imposed).105 This ground of 
mitigation was included in the 2006 Guidelines106 and is also set out in the Commission 
Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the TFEU to Horizontal Co-operation 
Agreements.107 
The Commission’s award of a 10% reduction in fines has recently been upheld in Deutsche 
Telekom AG108 and Wanadoo España v. Telefónica,109 two cases decided under Article 102 of 
the TFEU, concerning the abuse of unfair pricing through margin squeeze. In light of the 15% 
reduction in the Airfreight case,110 it is interesting to consider the Deutsche Telekom AG case, in 
which the Commission’s allocation of a 10% reduction in the fine because of the national 
regulatory framework was upheld on appeal to the CJEU.111 Deutsche Telekom was found to be 
in breach of Article 102 of the TFEU and fined €12.6 million for imposing unfair prices in the 
form of a margin squeeze.112 
Deutsche Telekom AG demonstrates the stringency with which the Commission, upheld by 
 
101 Id. at 39. 
102 See Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. I-8055. 
103 Id. ¶ 58. 
104 Id. This point is discussed in further detail below. 
105 Id. 
106 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 29. 
107 Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, 
8 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of TFEU Article 101 to Horizontal 
Co-operation Agreements]. 
108 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555, ¶ 264. 
109 Case T-336/07, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v. Comm’n, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 
62007T30336 (Mar. 29, 2012) (unpublished). 
110 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
111 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555, ¶ 264. 
112 Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Margin squeeze can occur where a vertically integrated undertaking controls 
access to infrastructure (upstream market) that is indispensable for access to the downstream 
market in which it also competes and where the dominant undertaking charges its competitors for 
access. Id. ¶ 4. 
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the CJEU, imposes the continued responsibility of undertakings to assess their own behavior 
with regard to the competition law provisions, despite the position taken by national authorities. 
Deutsche Telekom is the former monopoly provider of telecom services in Germany.113 Since 
August 1996, the German telecommunications market has been liberalized, and since June 1997, 
Deutsche Telekom has been required to provide competitors with fully unbundled access to the 
local loop at a “wholesale” price fixed by the national regulatory authority, the 
Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP).114 Those competitors were then 
able to compete with Deutsche Telekom in the provision of retail services to consumers through 
analogue lines, and were able to offer internet access though narrowband and broadband 
connections.115 The ensuing margin squeeze was between the wholesale prices charged by 
Deutsche Telekom to its competitors for access to the unbundled local loop and the prices it 
charged consumers for retail network access services.116 
Despite the facts that the wholesale price was set by the national regulator, that retail prices 
were subject to authorization or review by the same regulator, and that the national regulator 
investigated allegations of margin squeeze because of complaints by competitors on six 
occasions and rejected them, Deutsche Telekom was awarded only a 10% reduction in its fine 
due to the national regulatory framework.117 
Niamh Dunne argues that the problem in this case was an error in the national regulation118: 
“Ultimately, this case involved the sub-optimal use of competition law to correct a problem 
caused by inadequate regulation, in circumstances where the regulation itself was essentially 
immune from review.”119 
 
113 Id. ¶ 2. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. Retail network access is provided through either traditional analogue connection or 
digital narrowband connection (an integrated services digital network, or ISDN). Id. Access to 
these is via Deutsche Telekom’s existing copper pair network (narrowband connections). Id. 
Deutsche Telekom also offers end-users a broadband connection (an asymmetrical digital 
subscriber line, or ADSL), which requires upgrading the existing narrowband connections. Id. 
116 Id. ¶ 3. The term “‘local loop’ signifies the physical circuit connecting the network 
termination point at a subscriber’s premises to the main distribution frame or equivalent facility 
in the fixed public telephone network.” Id. ¶ 2. 
117 Id. ¶¶ 264, 279. 
118 Niamh Dunne, Margin Squeeze: From Broken Regulation to Legal Uncertainty, 70 
Cambridge L.J. 34, 36 (2011). 
119 Id. at 34–37. It should be noted, however, that the Commission raised the argument in the 
appeal before the CJEU that the excessive wholesale price was attributable to Deutsche Telekom 
itself. See Deutshe Telekom AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555, ¶¶ 35–40. The regulator had set the 
wholesale prices with reference to Deutsche Telekom’s submitted costs and Deutsche Telekom 
failed to inform it that those costs had decreased; however, the point was not adjudicated because 
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The breadth of the Commission’s discretion in setting fines for breach of the competition 
provisions has been subject to much debate and criticism. When applying this ground of 
mitigation, the unspecific wording of Article 29 of the 2006 Guidelines has enabled the 
Commission to set its own benchmark for what level of reduction in the fine is appropriate for 
“encouragement” by the national regulatory regime.120 
What is interesting is the very limited impact that national regulation had on the fine in 
Deutsche Telekom AG.121 By comparison, in the Airfreight case, the reduction for “the general 
regulatory environment” was 15%. 
Aside from Suiker Unie,122 the cases referred to above all concern specific actions, 
administrative decisions, or legislation by national regulatory authorities. By contrast, in the 
Airfreight cartel, the 15% reduction was granted to all the carriers “on account of the general 
regulatory environment in the sector[,] which can be seen as encouraging price coordination.”123 
While in the absence of a published decision the precise characteristics of the “general regulatory 
environment” cannot be definitively established, this does seem to be a novel use of this ground 
of mitigation because it is applied to a global regulatory environment rather than to specific, 
identified actions by national authorities or particular instances of national regulation, as in 
earlier cases.124 It is interesting that this mitigation was extended to all carriers irrespective of 
routes and therefore independent of the specific national regulation regulating particular 
routes.125 
III.  REGULATING AIR TRANSPORT 
As demand for air transport services increases, new airlines enter the market and existing 
airlines offer new routes or frequencies. Where this demand involves international travel, airlines 
typically depend on their respective governments to negotiate reciprocal, bilateral traffic rights 
vis-à-vis air service agreements (ASAs).126 It follows that dialogue between airlines and 
regulators is essential to effective operation of the industry. 
The air transport sector comprises two key business segments: passengers and cargo. Virtually 
all airlines have at least small-scale freight operations while some airlines perform strictly cargo 
 
it had not been raised in the original appeal to the General Court. See id. 
120 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, ¶ 29. 
121 Deutsche Telekom AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555, ¶ 279. 
122 Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663. 
123 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
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operations.127 Passenger airline services typically involve two parties: the passenger and the 
airline, and perhaps the passenger’s travel agent. Shipping by air, on the other hand, requires at 
least three parties: the sender, the carrier, and the consignee. Plus, in many instances, freight 
forwarders, consolidators (or “bulk-break agents”), and customs authorities may be involved.128 
It should be noted that the Chicago Convention introduced nine “freedoms of the air” in 
1944,129 the first five of which were subsequently adopted as express terms in most bilateral 
ASAs. The first ever ASA was the former Bermuda I Agreement between the United States and 
the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1946, which, together with the subsequent Bermuda II 
Agreement, set out which airlines could access which airports and with what frequency.130 
A.  Air Service Agreements 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published its 
Regulated Conduct Defence in February 2011,131 which discusses the Commission’s Airfreight 
decision in the context of bilateral ASAs “between the EU and third countries [that] . . . still 
contain restrictive clauses requiring designated carriers to agree on fares before filing them with 
Aviation Authorities.”132 
This would seem to be in breach of the clear duty imposed on national aeronautical authorities 
by the CJEU in 1986 in the Flugreisen case to “refrain from taking any measure which might be 
construed as encouraging airlines to conclude tariff agreements contrary to the Treaty.”133 
 
127 Massimo Geloso Grosso & Ben Shepherd, Liberalising Air Transport Services in APEC 12 
(Groupe D’Economie Mondiale, Working Paper, 2009), available at 
www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/GelosoGrosso_Shepherd_Liberalising_aircargo_services
_in_APEC102009.pdf. 
128 See id. at 7. 
129 Chicago Convention, supra note 126, arts. 10–13. 
130 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the 
United States of America Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories, U.S.–
U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda I ASA]. Signed in 1946, the Bermuda I 
ASA is an example of a “traditional” bilateral air service arrangement following the Chicago 
Convention between post-war aeronautical powers such as the United States and the U.K. In 
1977, the Bermuda II ASA amended the terms of the previous agreement and outlined, for 
instance, which airlines were permitted to fly to London’s Heathrow and Gatwick airports from 
designated U.S. cities. Consolidated Air Services Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, U.S.–U.K., July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367 [hereinafter Bermuda II ASA]. 
131 Policy Round Tables: Regulated Conduct Defence, DAF/COMP(2011)3, OECD 2, 3 
(2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/48606639.pdf. 
132 Id. at 199. 
133 Case C-66/86, Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., 1989 
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For the most part, the air transport sector remains regulated by a “complex web” of restrictive 
bilateral and reciprocal ASAs.134 Airlines called on governments in 2008 to reduce impediments 
to trade, specifically calling for greater liberalization of cargo ASAs.135 
There is a general trend toward liberalization of ASAs with new bilateral and multilateral 
ASAs agreed on “open skies” terms—allowing unrestricted service between the two or more 
state signatories—particularly with regard to passenger services.136 Notwithstanding that there 
are an estimated 3,000 ASAs currently in force, and that analyzing these ASAs presents a 
challenge, a number of empirical studies have been conducted137 that assess the extent of 
liberalization using the Cargo Air Liberalization Index (CALI).138 From these studies, it is 
apparent that the regulatory framework is liberalizing at the international level, albeit 
gradually.139 
Most U.S.-negotiated open skies agreements contain specific provisions that apply to all-cargo 
operations (freighters), but not belly cargo (mixed passenger–cargo services); the all-cargo 
provisions are typically more liberal than those for passenger services.140 Cargo tends to be 
regulated differently from passenger services, as the former is by definition unidirectional 
because the majority of consignments travel only one-way.141 In global air transport, this leads to 
a situation where airline operations are comprised of passenger and cargo divisions of 
“unbalanced” cargo yet “balanced” passengers.142 
The ASAs negotiated in the past between Member States and third countries tended to be 
more restrictive than the new wave of open skies and multilateral agreements negotiated by the 
EU.143 Certain bilateral ASAs between EU Member States and third countries established the 
“regulatory” process for setting tariffs, and these were less “liberalized” than the new EU-
 
E.C.R. 803, 852, 4 C.M.L.R. 102, ¶¶ 48–49 (1990). 
134 Pascal Achard, The Regulation of International Air Cargo Services, SciencesPo 
(2009), available at http://www.gem.sciences-
po.fr/content/research_topics/trade/RITS/Achard_Regulation_of_International_Air_Cargo_Servi
ces062009.pdf. 
135 See Istanbul Declaration, Int’l Aviation Transp. Ass’n (Mar. 2, 2008), 
www.iata.org/events/agm/2008/Pages/istanbul-declaration.aspx. 
136 Grosso & Shepherd, supra note 127, at 3. 
137 Achard, supra note 134, at 17. 
138 Id. 
139 Grosso & Shepherd, supra note 127, at 3. 
140 Achard, supra note 134, at 21. 
141 Anming Zhang & Yimin Zhang, A Model of Air Cargo Liberalisation: Passenger vs. All-
Cargo Carriers, 38 Transp. Res. Part E Logistics & Transp. Rev., 175, 7 (2002). 
142 Achard, supra note 134, at 14–16. 
143 Id. at 18–19. 
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mandated ones.144 This is relevant to note in connection with the assumption, which Pascal 
Achard has proven empirically, that more liberal ASAs are linked to higher trade flows.145 
B.  European Air Transport 
Air transport is mentioned only once in the TFEU, in Article 100, which provides that: 
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to transport by rail, road and inland waterway. 
(2) The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air transport. They 
shall act after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions.146 
The legal framework of the EU as it relates to air transport is two-fold: the sector is now 
subject to the general rules on competition (under Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU)147 just as 
all other sectors, but air transport policy is determined by the European Parliament and 
Council.148 
The four main objectives of the EU’s air transport regulatory framework are: “facilitating the 
airlines’ financing ability”; “ensuring the respect of the internal market rules”; “creating 
conditions for fair and equitable competition”; and “extending the liberalization policy to third-
country routes.”149 
European air transport policy has matured over the past decade and a half, during which time 
the EU air transport market has been liberalized incrementally vis-à-vis three internal market 
“liberalization packages”; the final package came in 1993, though arguably the market was not 
fully liberalized until 2004.150 In any case, the packages influenced more overt national markets, 
 
144 Id. at 19. 
145 Id. at 41. 
146 TFEU, supra note 22, art. 100 (emphasis added). 
147 Id. arts. 101–02. 
148 Id. art. 100. 
149 Steven Truxal, Competition and Regulation in the Airline Industry: Puppets in Chaos 
82 (2013). This includes the on-going problem of state aid being offered to flag carriers by the 
respective Member States. 
150 See Market Integration Theory, Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/internal_market/integration_en.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 
2013). It is reasonably argued that the liberalization of the internal EU market for air transport 
was not completed until the CJEU “open skies” judgments in 2002 and indeed not fully 
liberalized until the transfer of exclusive (external) competence for EU external air transport in 
2004. See id. 
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and created the single European air transport market and the “Single European Sky.”151 Until 
1993, there was much debate on the appropriate application of the competition rules to the 
industry, but the best argument for the delay was that the sector was not yet sufficiently 
liberalized, and therefore, the EU competition rules would have had little or no real effect. 
However, a highly significant case in 1985, Nouvelles Frontières,152 confirmed that the 
competition rules did indeed apply to the air transport sector. At the same time, it established that 
prior to the adoption of legislation under Article 87 of the TEC, national courts could not apply 
Articles 85(1) and 85(2) of the TEC to hold an anticompetitive agreement void, unlike the 
situation in other areas where the national courts could directly apply Articles 81(1) and 81(2) of 
the TEC.153 
During the liberalization of the EU air transport sector, the Commission devised a number of 
legal measures to apply EU competition law to the sector in a gradual and effective manner. The 
liberalization process encouraged an incremental relinquishing of Member State controls in the 
sector and vested future oversight centrally in the EU. This process is perhaps best demostrated 
by the area of market access and traffic rights. 
“Council Decision 87/602 under the first phase of the liberalization process and Council 
Regulation 2343/90 were ‘measures designed to introduce greater freedom of access to air 
transport markets to bring about a single market for air transport, albeit gradually.’”154 These 
regulations “assign[ed] substantive rights and obligations to individual Member States and the 
[EU with respect to EU] air transport, in particular . . . free market access to all intra[-EU] air 
 
151 See Single European Sky, Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). This 
denotes a single European commercial airspace under the management of Eurocontrol, the body 
empowered by the EU to control air traffic for the entire Union. See id.; see also Council 
Decision 2004/636/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 204. 
152 Joined Cases 209–213/84, Ministère Public v. Lucas Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425. 
153 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 81–82, 
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 64–65 [hereinafter TEC]. National courts could only apply 
the competition provisions if (1) there had been a prior ruling of infringement by the “competent 
authority” of a Member State, acting under the interim provision of Article 88 of the TEC, that 
there had been a breach of Article 81 of the TEC, or (2) where the Commission, acting under 
Article 89(2) of the TEC, on application by a Member State or on its own initiative, had 
investigated and found an infringement. Id. arts. 88–89. If the infringement was not brought to an 
end, the Commission could record the infringement in a “reasoned Decision” and authorize the 
Member State to take measures. Id. The Commission had no power itself to take action against 
an undertaking to compel it to bring an infringement to an end. Id. 
154 Truxal, supra note 149, at 83. 
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routes.”155 
As part of the third and final phase of the liberalization, a number of regulations aimed to: 
ensure equal market access and traffic rights for all designated EU carriers; provide an 
appropriate procedure and relevant criteria for the licensing of EU carriers; ensure air fares and 
cargo rates are deregulated; develop a code of conduct for computer reservations systems 
(CRSs); and establish procedural rules for the application of the competition rules on state aid in 
the air transport sector.156 
Following the Nouvelles Frontière case and the three liberalization packages, Council 
Regulation 3975/87157 established the procedure for applying the rules on competition to 
undertakings in the air transport sector.158 The Flugreisen159 case came to the CJEU soon after the 
enactment of Regulation 3975/87—which allowed the Commission to take action in the air 
transport sector under Articles 85(1) and (2) of the TEC, thereby establishing the procedure for 
applying for an individual exemption—and Regulation 3976/87—a block exemption covering 
certain categories of agreements and concerted sector practices, such as consultations.160 
“Consultations on tariffs or fares are [a] common, worldwide practice in the airline industry.”161 
 
155 Id. Council Regulation 2408/92 “subsequently amended these provisions under the third 
wave of the [EU]’s market liberalization process.” Id. at 83 n.109. 
156 See Council Regulation 323/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 40) 1; Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 
O.J. (L 240) 15, 15–16; Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8, 8–9; Council 
Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 1–2; Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State Aids in the Aviation Sector, 1994 O.J. (C 
350) 5, 8. 
157 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2. This created the “general regulation” 
(Council Regulation 17/62) for the implementation of EU competition law to the air transport 
sector. Id.; see Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 38. Article 1 empowered the Commission to 
apply the rules directly to intra-Community routes. Council Regulation 3975/97, supra. Council 
Regulations 1284/91 and 2410/92 amended Regulation 3975/87. See Council Regulation 
2410/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 18; Council Regulation 1284/91, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 2. 
158 This procedure was amended by Council Regulation 2410/92 and subsequently repealed 
and replaced by Council Regulation 411/2004. See Council Regulation 411/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 
68) 1, 2; Council Regulation 2410/92, supra note 157. 
159 Case C-66/86, Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., 1989 
E.C.R. 803, 852, 4 C.M.L.R. 102, ¶ 48 (1990). 
160 See Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 9, 10. 
161 The CJEU “recognized the need to distinguish between price-fixing and ‘consultation’ on 
tariffs” but admitted that this is not an easy distinction to draw. Truxal, supra note 149, at 76. 
Consultation on tariffs was exempted from Article 101(1) under Regulation 2671/88. See id. 
Consultation must be intended solely to prepare joint tariff proposals, which are not binding on 
the participants, who must remain free to put forward different tariff proposals to the relevant 
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“These consultations are held on a bilateral or multilateral conference basis.”162 
The CJEU held that the enactment of Regulation 3976/87 meant that Articles 81(1) and 81(2) 
of the TEC could be applied by the national courts directly, as it was now possible for the courts 
to apply Article 85(3) at the same time.163 An anti-competitive agreement would therefore be 
automatically void without a finding by the competent authorities under Articles 88 or 89.164 
However, this was only true with regard to flights between EU airports.165 Breaches of the 
competition laws with respect to domestic flights and flights between Member States and third 
countries could not be enforced by national courts but rather only vis-à-vis transitional rules 
under Articles 88 and 89.166 
This situation was remedied by the enactment of Regulation 411/2004, which repealed 
Regulation 3975/87 and extended the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement 
with respect to flights between Member States and third countries.167 In other words, by 2004, the 
competition laws were finally applicable to the entire air transport sector on the same basis as 
other industries. 
Two further reforms aimed at standardization of the regulations applicable to different routes 
were the adoption of Common Position 7/2004, which sets out the appropriate procedure for the 
future negotiation and implementation of multilateral ASAs between Member States and third 
countries,168 and Regulation 847/2004, which provides for the compatible standardization of pre-
existing bilateral ASAs between Member States and non-EU countries.169 
In relation to the EU’s external aviation policy, the Council welcomed comprehensive 
agreements: “[T]he inseparable twin aims of comprehensive open aviation area agreements 
should be, on the one hand, market opening creating new economic opportunities and investment 
possibilities, and, on the other hand, a process of regulatory convergence that ensures a 
 
aeronautical authorities and then to apply those alternative tariffs; additionally, participation in 
consultations must be open to all air carriers with an interest in the relevant routes. See id. 
162 “The major international conference for scheduling and fares is held biannually in June and 
November under the framework and oversight of IATA.” Id. 
163 Flugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. at 845, 4 C.M.L.R. ¶ 20. 
164 See TEC, supra note 153, arts. 88–89. 
165 Flugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. at 845, 4 C.M.L.R. ¶ 21. 
166 See id.; TEC, supra note 153, arts. 88–89. 
167 Council Regulation 411/2004, supra note 158, at 1–2 (repealing Regulation 3975/87 and 
amending Regulations 3976/87 and 1/2003, in connection with air transport between the 
Community and third countries). 
168 Council Common Position (EC) No. 7/2004 of 5 Dec. 2003, 2004 O.J. (C 54 E) 33; see also 
Council Regulation 868/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 1. 
169 See Council Regulation 847/2004, supra note 15, at 8. 
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satisfactory level playing field with fair and equitable competition conditions.”170 
The Council also urged the Commission to “bring the current negotiations with the United 
States to a successful and mutually satisfactory conclusion as early as possible”; the result of 
these negotiations was the EU–U.S. “Open Skies” Agreement, which came into force in March 
2008.171 
C.  Block Exemptions 
Particularly noteworthy is the special treatment of the airline industry in the context of block 
exemptions issued in the 1980s and 1990s that exempted agreements on pooling revenue, 
limiting of capacities, and tariffs172—clear infringements of Article 101(1) of the TFEU. 
Commission Regulation 1617/93, which renewed Regulation 2671/88, exempted from Article 
101(1) “certain categories of agreements and concerted practices concerning joint planning and 
coordination of schedules, joint operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on 
scheduled air services,” and slot allocation at airports with the aim of facilitating “interlining,” 
subject to certain a priori conditions.173 
Initially, cargo tariff consultations “benefited [from] a block exemption under Commission 
Regulation 1617/93, which effectively enabled European airlines to agree on tariffs for the 
carriage of freight.”174 In 1996, however, the Commission removed cargo operations from the 
scope of the block exemption.175 Exemptions with respect to passenger airline operations 
continued but were amended five times between 1993 and 2002.176 
The Commission reviewed and renewed a series of revised block exemptions for passenger 
airlines via the Internatational Air Transport Association (IATA) in October 2006 under Block 
Exemption Regulation (EC) No. 1459/2006, resulting in a reduction of the scope of the 
 
170 Council Conclusions on Developing the Agenda for the Community’s External Aviation 
Policy, at 4, COM (2005) 79 final (Mar. 11, 2005). 
171 Id. at 5. 
172 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Takes Preliminary View that IATA Cargo 
Tariff Consultations Infringe Competition Rules (May 15, 2001), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-694_en.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Commission 
Takes Preliminary View]. 
173 Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 14, at 18–19; see Truxal, supra note 149, at 
92. 
174 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172. 
175 Commission Regulation 1523/96, 1996 O.J. (L 190) 11, 12. 
176 See Commission Regulation 1105/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 167) 6; Commission Regulation 
1324/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 177) 56; Commission Regulation 1083/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 131) 24; 
Commission Regulation 1523/96, supra note 175; Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 
14. 
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exemptions.177 Finally, the Commission decided not to renew (1) the block exemptions expiring 
in June 2007 for routes between the EU, United States, and Australia, and (2) the block 
exemptions expiring in October 2007 for routes between the EU and other third countries on the 
grounds that the benefits to consumers were outweighed by the anti-competitive effects.178 As a 
result, the IATA and individual carriers have been required since 2007 to ensure that their 
agreements are fully compliant with EU competition rules.179 
D.  Airline and Cargo Alliances 
An airline alliance, which in essence is a cooperative agreement between two or more airlines, 
is typically established as a means to extend and optimize flight networks, reduce costs, and offer 
greater benefits to consumers.180 The level of cooperation between partners to an airline alliance 
varies from sharing frequent flyer programs or airport lounges, to minimum standards for crew 
uniforms, seat comfort, and in-flight services, to a “stock investment by one airline in its 
partner.”181 Many alliances “began as codeshare agreements aimed at extending existing flight 
networks and have subsequently developed into regional or global alliances.”182 Alliances 
involving so-called codeshare agreements may have the potential for both pro-competitive and 
anti-competitive effects.183 “On the [pro-competitive] side, they can create new service, improve 
existing service, lower costs, and increase efficiency, all to the benefit of consumers. On the 
[anti-competitive] side, they can result in market allocation, capacity limitations, higher fares, or 
foreclosure of rivals from markets, all to the injury of consumers.”184 
Perhaps the most significant development “in recent years has been the emergence of a 
grouping of major carriers in the form of deeper and more complex alliances extending to all 
aspects of the airline business.”185 The three largest global airline alliances are Star Alliance, One 
World, and Sky Team.186 
 
177 Commission Regulation 1459/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 272) 3, 3–5. 
178 See id. at 4–5. 
179 Press Release, Commission Ends Block Exemption, supra note 17. 
180 See Truxal, supra note 149, at 136. 
181 International Aviation Alliances: Market Turmoil and the Future of Airline Competition: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition & Bus. Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of R. Hewitt Pate, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Antitrust Div.) [hereinafter Pate Hearing]. 
182 Truxal, supra note 149, at 137. 
183 A “codeshare” occurs when one airline operates a service but allows another to offer that 
service for purchase under its flight designator code. Pate Hearing, supra note 181, at 5. 
184 Id. at 6. 
185 Truxal, supra note 149, at 137. 
186 Id. 
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Lufthansa Cargo and its passenger side, Lufthansa German Airlines, belong to Star Alliance, 
capturing the alliance’s additional members as potential partners for joint cargo operations.187 
This means that whatever agreements the passenger airline enters into may incorporate its cargo 
business as well, whether the agreement is a codeshare with another passenger (integrated) 
airline or a block space agreement with an all-cargo carrier, such as DHL. 
The capacities of global air cargo alliances are remarkable, particularly since freight is time-
sensitive rather than based on loyalty or preference, as with passenger flights. Sky Team Cargo, 
with its members Aero Mexico, Air France, Alitalia, Czech Airlines, Delta Air Logistics, and 
Korean Air, carried 2.093 million tons of international freight combined in 2002.188 
The Commission has investigated a number of joint ventures undertaken by members of 
alliances. More recently, in January 2012, the Commission launched an investigation into 
whether a transatlantic joint venture between Air France-KLM, Alitalia, and Delta—members of 
the Sky Team alliance—infringes Article 101 of the TFEU.189 Another investigation into 
transatlantic cooperation between Air Canada, Lufthansa, Continental Airlines, and United 
Airlines—members of the Star Alliance—was started in 2009 and is still ongoing.190 
E.  Special Treatment 
The air transport sector is inherently information sharing. Examples include network and fare 
conferences, which in the past had antitrust immunity;191 the publication of fares, which often 
leads to so-called “fare wars”; and a trend toward cooperative arrangements between airlines in 
the form of strategic alliances.192 It can also be argued that the existing coordination between 
 
187 About Lufthansa, Star Alliance, 
http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/airlines/lufthansa_airlines/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
188 Aaron Karp, Airlines Pairing Off, 94 Air Cargo World 20, 25 (2004) (citing IATA 
figures). 
189 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Opens a Probe into Transatlantic 
Joint Venture Between Air France-KLM, Alitalia and Delta and Closes Proceedings Against 
Eight Members of Sky Team Airline Alliance (Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-79_en.htm. 
190 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Proceedings 
Against Certain Members of Star and Oneworld Airline Alliances (Apr. 20, 2009), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-168_en.htm. 
191 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Competition: Commission Revises Block Exemption for 
IATA Passenger Tariff Conferences (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-06-1294_en.htm. 
192 See Joe Sharkey, Forget the Airlines’ Name; It’s All About Alliances, N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/business/global/forget-the-airlines-name-its-all-
about-alliances.html. 
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airlines through interline agreements193 demonstrates that the mechanics of the practical 
operation of the global air network requires cooperation. 
It seems therefore that the current regulatory environment has required the industry to 
introduce changes to its structure so as to ensure a level of workable competition on par with that 
which is expected in other industries. One must be mindful that the air transport sector possesses 
unique characteristics, and although it is not the aim of this article to elaborate on that point, it is 
interesting to consider the phenomenon of strategic, increasingly intimate worldwide alliances 
forming within this regulatory space.194 
IV.  THE APPEALS 
The following section offers an analysis of the regulatory framework within which the sector 
currently operates, focusing on those aspects that might be considered to “encourage” price 
coordination. 
Four of the appeals lodged against the Commission’s decision have raised, inter alia, the state 
action defense in relation to certain flights between EU Member States and third countries, 
arguing that state regulation precluded application of the competition rules and therefore there 
was no breach of Article 101 of the TFEU; those appeals have been brought by Deutsche 
Lufthansa,195 Cathay Pacific,196 British Airways,197 and Singapore Airlines and Singapore 
Airlines Cargo PTE.198 
A.  State Action 
A possible defense to a finding of infringement of the competition rules is the “state action” 
defense—if anticompetitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if 
national legislation creates a regulatory framework which eliminates any possibility of 
 
193 “Interlining is an agreement between two carriers, under which each carrier may accept the 
other’s tickets in exchange for transport.” Truxal, supra note 149, at 121. Passengers therefore 
have the opportunity to travel with one airline’s tickets on flights operated by many other carriers 
worldwide. See id. The interline agreement may thus be seen as an industrial construct; “the 
arrangement is fundamental to the operation of the industry from both a corporate and 
competition perspective.” Id. 
194 See id. 
195 Case T-46/11, Deutsche Lufthansa v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 31. 
196 Case T-38/11, Cathay Pac. Airways v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 32. 
197 Case T-48/11, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 32. 
198 Case T-43/11, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. 
(C 89) 21. 
Originally printed and presented in the Journal of Air Law and Commerce 78 J. Air L. & Com. 54 I. Reprinted 
in amended form with permission from the Journal of Air Law and Commerce and Southern Methodist 
University. 
 
competitive activity, the competition rules will not apply.199 
This defense was first raised successfully in Suiker Unie, where it was held that Italian 
regulation of the sugar market left no scope for competition and the Commission’s finding of an 
infringement of Article 101 was thus annulled.200 The defense has been raised on many occasions 
since then, generally without success.201 
The law was clarified in CIF, where the question arose whether a national competition 
authority (NCA) that has found a breach of the competition rules by national legislation is 
authorized or indeed obliged to disapply the offending provisions.202 The CJEU, citing Fratelli 
Costanzo, held that the obligation to disapply national law that conflicts with EU law applies not 
only to national courts but also to all organs of the state, including administrative bodies.203 
In CIF, the CJEU held that undertakings that have infringed upon EU competition rules as a 
result of complying with national legislation would not be “accountable” for that infringement 
for the period when the national legislation is in force.204 This was due to the EU general 
principle of “legal certainty.”205 The CJEU held that the national law constitutes a “justification 
which shields the undertakings concerned from all the consequences of an infringement of 
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC.”206 However, this protection will no longer apply once the NCA has 
made a decision that the national law is contrary to the competition rules and has disapplied it. 
The most recent formulation of the defense comes from Deutsche Telekom.207 Where “anti-
competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation, or if the latter creates a 
legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part,” 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU do not apply because “the restriction of competition is not 
attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the 
undertakings.”208 
The CJEU makes clear, however, that Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU will apply if the 
 
199 See, e.g., Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663. 
200 Id. ¶¶ 36–73. 
201 See, e.g., Commission Decision 85/206, Aluminum Imports from Eastern Europe, 1985 
O.J. (L 92) 1. 
202 Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorità Garanie della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. I-8055. 
203 Id.; see also Case C-66/86, Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs 
E.V., 1989 E.C.R. 803, 852, 4 C.M.L.R. 102, ¶ 49 (1990). 
204 Consorzio Industrie Frammifui (CIF), 2003 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 51. 
205 Id. ¶ 53. 
206 Id. ¶ 54. 
207 See also Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of TFEU Article 101 to Horizontal 
Co-operation Agreements, supra note 107, ¶ 22. 
208 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555, ¶ 80. 
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national legislation leaves scope for the possibility of competition; it points out that the defense 
has “been accepted only to a limited extent by the Court of Justice,” meaning that it has been 
narrowly interpreted.209 
The judgment continues, stating that if national law merely encourages or makes it easier for 
undertakings to engage in anti-competitive conduct, the competition rules will be applied, and 
the undertakings will be found to be in breach.210 However, as we have seen, such 
encouragement or facilitation of a breach of the rules by the national authorities may lead to 
mitigation of the severity of the fines imposed, at the Commission’s discretion. 
It seems that the failure of the national authorities to explicitly annul or disapply bilateral 
ASAs requiring agreement on tariffs between airlines may be significant in the consideration of 
this defense, as will be explored below. 
In the absence of a published decision in the Airfreight case, the final part of this article 
considers how ASAs between EU Member States and third counties provided a regulatory 
framework governing airfreight transport that has raised the possibility of this defense. If 
successfully pleaded, this defense would result in the annulment of relevant parts of the 
infringement decision itself. This discussion involves an examination of a selection of ASAs, 
with a focus on those between the U.K. and third-country jurisdictions that regulated the airspace 
in which the air carriers in the case operated. 
Cathay Pacific argues that “[t]he vast majority of events reported in the decision against the 
applicant . . . do not amount to an infringement as they relate to the exchange of publicly 
available information [or] are part of a mandated collective regulatory approval process.”211 This 
airline also challenges the Commission’s finding that 
the applicant was not required to participate in the collective application process in seeking 
the approval of surcharges by the Civil Aviation Department (CAD) of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). . . . 
[C]arriers were required to agree on the details of the collective applications, including the 
amount of the surcharge for which approval was sought and were bound to charge the 
surcharges fixed by the CAD.212 
It further appeals the Commission’s rejection of “the state compulsion defen[s]e” with regard to 
“the applicant’s conduct in Hong Kong (and India, Sri Lanka, Japan, the Philippines and 
Singapore).”213 
 
209 Id. ¶ 81. 
210 Id. ¶ 82. 
211 Case T-38/11, Cathay Pac. Airways v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 32, ¶ 1. 
212 Id. at 33, ¶ 2. 
213 Id. at 33, ¶ 3. It also appealed on the ground that “the Commission erred in law in its 
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Singapore Airlines appeals on the ground that the Commission failed to take into account the 
fact that in a number of foreign jurisdictions, the allegedly illegal “conduct was actively 
supervised and effectively required by government agencies.”214 Also, Lufthansa appeals on the 
ground that “government intervention in a number of relevant jurisdictions precludes the 
application of Article 101 [TFEU].”215 
Four other airlines have challenged the 15% reduction of fines on the ground that 15% was 
“manifestly insufficient,”216 or that it was insufficient on the grounds of breach of “the principles 
of proportionality,”217 or of both proportionality and equal treatment.218 
B.  ASAs Reviewed—U.K. and Third Countries 
In this section, we identify and review documentary evidence of the terms of ASAs between 
the U.K. and seven non-EU countries (Japan, Thailand, India, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
and South Korea).219 In all instances, the U.K. and the respective third country have agreed to an 
ASA. Subsequently, in most cases, the two national authorities have amended the ASA, signed a 
 
treatment of the regulatory regime in Hong Kong in comparison with the relevant equivalent 
regulatory regime in Dubai. It should have excluded Cathay Pacific and Hong Kong on a similar 
basis as it excluded Dubai from the scope of the infringement.” Id. at 33, ¶ 5. 
214 Case T-43/11, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. 
(C 89) 21, 21–22, ¶ 3. 
215 Case T-46/11, Deutsche Lufthansa v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 31, ¶ 4. 
216 See Case T-62/11, Air France-KLM v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 95) 8, 9, ¶ 12. 
217 See Case T-67/11, Martinair Holland v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 95) 9, 10, ¶ 2; Case T-
36/11, Japan Airlines v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 25, 26, ¶ 3. 
218 See Case T-28/11, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (KLM) v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 
72) 30, 31, ¶ 4. 
219 These countries were selected on the basis of their mention in one or more of the airlines’ 
appeals of the Commission decision. Agreement for Air Services, U.K.–Japan, Dec. 29, 1952, 
175 U.N.T.S. 130 [hereinafter U.K.–Japan ASA]; Agreement for Air Services Between and 
Beyond Their Respective Territories, U.K.–Thai., Nov. 10, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 94 [hereinafter 
U.K.–Thailand ASA]; Agreement Relating to Air Services, U.K.–India, Dec. 1, 1951, 12 
U.N.T.S. 40 [hereinafter U.K.–India 1951 ASA]; Air Transport Agreement, U.K.–Brazil, Oct. 
31, 1946, 11 U.N.T.S. 116 [hereinafter U.K.–Brazil ASA]; Agreement for Air Services Between 
and Beyond Their Respective Territories, U.K.–Sing., Jan. 12, 1971, 788 U.N.T.S. 146 
[hereinafter U.K.–Singapore ASA]; Agreement Between the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Air Services, U.K.–H.K., 
July 25, 1997, 2050 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter U.K.–Hong Kong ASA]; Agreement for Air 
Services Between and Beyond Their Respective Administrative Territories, U.K.–S. Kor., Mar. 
5, 1984, 1416 U.N.T.S. 160 [hereinafter U.K.–South Korea ASA]. 
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memorandum of understanding (MOU) amending the ASA, or communicated new terms by 
official letter. 
The current status of relations in air services between the U.K. and the countries listed above 
is mixed. First, since 1950, designated airlines operating routes between the U.K. and Thailand 
have been required to set fares through the IATA unless otherwise agreed by airlines.220 Second, 
designated airlines were required to reach agreement regarding tariffs on flights between the 
U.K. and Japan via IATA (between 1952 and 2000) and between the U.K. and Singapore via 
IATA (between 1971 and 2001).221 Similarly, though without mention of the IATA, the 1951 
ASA between the U.K. and India required airlines to agree to or at least consult each other 
regarding tariffs from 1951 until 2004.222 Finally, designated airlines were to consult each other 
regarding tariffs on services between the U.K. and South Korea from 1984 to 2001 “whenever 
possible.”223 
A closer look at the documentary evidence reveals a number of turning points in the history of 
the ASAs above. It is possible that the amendments were made in response to an awareness that a 
requirement for agreement between airlines on tariffs could be in breach of competition rules, 
although we have no documentary evidence to substantiate this. As early as 2000, and continuing 
through 2004, there was a discernible increase in dialogue between the states, ranging from 
initial communication to consensus, finally resulting in agreement to amend the language of the 
ASAs. One turning point occurred in 2000 when the U.K. and Japan signed an MOU, which 
made clear that “designated airlines . . . will not be required to consult each other on proposed 
tariffs,”224 changing the previous requirement of agreement on tariffs either “through the rate-
fixing machinery”225 of the IATA or by mutual agreement. 
In 2001, the consultation requirement was lifted for designated airlines on routes between the 
U.K. and South Korea,226 and between the U.K. and Singapore.227 In the case of the U.K. and 
 
220 See U.K.–Thailand ASA, supra note 219. It has been argued that the IATA is itself an 
example of tight cartelization and effectively serves as a platform for the international fuel 
surcharge cartel. Rigas Doganis, Flying off Course: The Economics of International Airlines, 
38–39 (2d ed. 2012). 
221 See U.K.–Japan ASA, supra note 219; U.K.–Singapore ASA, supra note 219. 
222 See U.K.–India 1951 ASA, supra note 219. 
223 See U.K.–South Korea ASA, supra note 219. 
224 Memorandum of Understanding, U.K.–Japan, art. 3, Sept. 22, 2000 (on file with author). 
225 U.K.–Japan ASA, supra note 219, ¶ 2. 
226 Memorandum of Understanding Amending the Air Services Agreement Done at Seoul on 5 
March 1984, U.K.–S. Kor., June 29, 2001 (on file with author) (replacing Article 8 of the 1984 
ASA between the U.K. and South Korea). 
227 Memorandum of Understanding, U.K.–Sing., Oct. 25–26, 2001 (on file with author) 
(replacing Article 9 of the 1971 ASA between the U.K. and Singapore). 
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India, the lifting of this requirement came only in 2005, from which point forward prior 
consultation on tariffs was and is no longer required.228 Furthermore, national authorities agreed 
to ensure that tariffs reflect market conditions and agreed to reciprocally approve the other 
national authority’s tariffs.229 
The ASA between the U.K. and Hong Kong (1999) does not require prior consultation by 
airlines, whereas the U.K. and Brazil ASA (1999) does not even require filing of tariffs.230 
C.  ASA Reviewed—EU and United Arab Emirates 
The multilateral ASA between the EU and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), by way of 
example as a hub of paramount importance for EU–Far East air traffic, aims to consolidate ASAs 
that were agreed upon earlier between each of the Member States and the UAE.231 It also 
reinforces in its preamble that under EU law, agreements that may affect trade between Member 
States and prevent, restrict, or distort competition cannot be entered into.232 Article 6(1) of the 
UAE–EU Agreement makes clear that nothing in earlier bilateral agreements between Member 
States and the UAE shall 
(i) favour the adoption of agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings or concerted practices that prevent or distort competition; 
(ii) reinforce the effects of any such agreement, decision or concerted practice; or 
(iii) delegate to private economic operators the responsibility for taking measures that 
prevent, distort or restrict competition.233 
If the effect of an earlier agreement between the UAE and a particular Member State contains 
provisions that are incompatible with the points outlined above, they shall not apply from the 
date of the UAE–EU Agreement going forward.234 This template is to be applied 
comprehensively to all such instances of incompatibility where an amended or new agreement 
 
228 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India Concerning Air Services art. 15, ¶ 2, U.K.–
India, Sept. 8, 2005 [hereinafter U.K.–India 2005 ASA] (amending the position laid down in 
Article 6 of the 1951 ASA between the U.K. and India, which required that: tariffs shall always 
be agreed or at least consulted upon; airlines shall regard rates adopted by IATA; and all tariffs 
are ultimately subject to the approval of national authorities). 
229 Id. art. 15, ¶¶ 1, 3. 
230 U.K.–Hong Kong ASA, supra note 219, art. 6, ¶ 3; U.K.–Brazil ASA, supra note 219, ¶ 2. 
231 Agreement Between the European Community and the United Arab Emirates on Certain 
Aspects of Air Services, EU–U.A.E., 2008 O.J. (L 28) 21 [hereinafter EU–U.A.E. ASA]. 
232 Id. at 21. 
233 Id. art. 6, ¶ 1. 
234 Id. art. 6, ¶¶ 1–2. 
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has been reached.235 The above reflects very clearly the language and intent of the EU 
competition rules and clarifies any doubt as to private firms’ (carriers’) own responsibility to 
ensure that agreements and behavior comply with Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 
There are no similar fully multilateral agreements on the books, however, between the EU and 
Japan, Thailand, India, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, or South Korea. In an International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) 2004 working paper, a progress report claims that the “[EU] 
Member States have now concluded new agreements or revised existing bilateral agreements 
with over thirty other ICAO States to permit the designation of European Community carriers on 
routes to [and] from their territories.”236 The 2002 CJEU open skies judgments237 prompted the 
removal of nationality clauses in ASAs to ensure nondiscrimination between carriers with the 
Community designation.238 
Nonetheless, evidence shows that nationality restrictions in preexisting bilateral ASAs with 
EU Member States were fully removed sometime later: Singapore’s in 2006,239 India’s in 2008,240 
 
235 Id. art. 6, ¶ 2; see also id. art. 9, ¶ 3. 
236 Ownership and Control: Recognizing New Developments 4 (Int’l Civil Aviation Org., 
Working Paper A35-WP/96, 2004), available at 
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf.6.WP.94.2.en.pdf. 
237 See generally Joined Cases C-466/98, Comm’n v. U.K., 2002 E.C.R. I-9427; Case C-
467/98, Comm’n v. Den., 2002 E.C.R. I-9519; Case C-468/98, Comm’n v. Swed., 2002 E.C.R. I-
9575; Case C-469/98, Comm’n v. Fin., 2002 E.C.R. I-9627; Case C-471/98, Comm’n v. Belg., 
2002 E.C.R. I-9681; Case C-472/98, Comm’n v. Lux., 2002 E.C.R. I-09741; Case C-475/98, 
Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I-9797; Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. Ger., 2002 E.C.R. I-9855. 
There was “split competence” for air transport prior to 2002 insofar as the Community regulated 
the internal market while Member States were free to enter into ASAs with third countries. Since 
the “open skies” ruling, the EU has exercised exclusive external competence for air transport. 
Although outside the scope of this article, the application of the CJEU’s two doctrines on implied 
external powers (based on Opinion 1/76 (pursuant to Article 228(1) of the TEEC) and the ERTA 
doctrine (“European Road Transport Agreement”)) is also of interest. See Opinion 1/76 of the 
Court of Justice, Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Waterway 
Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741; Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 264; see also L. 
Heffernan & C. McAuliffe, External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: The Court of Justice 
and the Open Skies Agreements, 28 E.L. Rev., no. 5, 2003, at 601. 
238 Following this ruling, the European Council agreed upon a standard clause on designation, 
which is to be used in future negotiations; the clause provides for the designation of a carrier 
established in any Member State as a “Community air carrier” rather than a discriminatory 
designation, e.g., “U.K. air carrier.” Commission Decision on Approving the Standard Clauses 
for Inclusion in Bilateral Air Service Agreements Between Member States and Third Countries 
Jointly Laid Down by the Commission and the Member States, Annex, 2005 O.J. (C 943) 3. 
239 See International Aviation: Singapore, Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/singapore_en.htm 
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South Korea’s in 2008,241 and Japan’s in 2009.242 Negotiations between the EU and Brazil are 
ongoing243 following a horizontal agreement on certain aspects of air services in 2009.244 
D.  ASAs as Defense? 
The following section reflects on the feasibility of arguing that the ASAs identified above 
between EU Member States and third countries provided a regulatory framework governing 
airfreight transport, which was the basis for the 15% reduction in fines. 
Elsewhere in this article, two potential layers in the general regulatory environment, as 
referred to in the available details of the Airfreight decision, are identified: the ASA and the 
competition rules. Some ASAs require designated airlines to consult “locally” and agree on 
tariffs—that is, independent of the IATA—before the tariffs can be approved. Other ASAs 
require airlines to do this via the IATA mechanism. 
As discussed above, a general block exemption existed to facilitate interlining in passenger 
and cargo services from 1988 to 1996, specifically for “certain categories of agreements, 
decisions, and concerted practices” concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, 
joint operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air services, and slot 
allocation at airports.245 Cargo operations were removed from the scope of the block exemption 
in 1997 (with some parts already suspended in 1996),246 although a conditional block exemption 
continued for IATA passenger tariffs until 2007.247 
Owing to the changing nature of the regulatory regime for airlines in the period from 1988 to 
 
(last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
240 See International Aviation: India, Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/india_en.htm (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
241 See International Aviation: Korea (Republic of), Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/south_korea_en.ht
m (last updated Feb. 26, 2013). 
242 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Breakthrough in EU-Japan Aviation Relations (Jan. 16, 
2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-64_en.htm. 
243 See International Aviation: Brazil, Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/brazil_en.htm (last 
updated July 17, 2013). 
244 See Proposal for a Council Decision on the Signature of the Agreement on Certain Aspects 
of Air Services Between the European Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil, COM 
(2009) 411 final (Aug. 3, 2009). 
245 Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 160, art. 2, ¶ 2. 
246 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172. 
247 Press Release, Commission Ends Block Exemption, supra note 17. 
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2007, which encompasses the period of infringement for the decision (1999 to 2006), what is of 
great significance is when the terms of the ASAs and subsequent MOUs were effective. In other 
words, an ASA which requires airlines to consult others regarding cargo tariffs after 1997 would 
place an airline in an uncomfortable position between two layers of regulation: the ASA and the 
competition rules. 
Already in 2001, the Commission took the preliminary view that the IATA consultations on 
cargo tariffs breached EU competition rules.248 In response, the IATA agreed to no longer set 
intra-EEA tariffs from 2002 onwards.249 Apparently, the IATA continued to facilitate cargo 
tariffs on non-EEA routes.250 
It is also clear that carriers continued to discuss and agree upon tariffs independently from the 
IATA. Since there was no exemption after 1997, the practice of agreeing upon tariffs—whether 
multilaterally, and arguably “transparently,” via the IATA, or “locally” by mutual agreement 
between carriers—prima facie appears to have breached the EU competition rules. At the same 
time, certain ASAs required airlines to consult each other for some or all of the period from 1997 
to 2004.251 
The third and final layer in the “regulatory environment” for airlines is the regulatory lag vis-
à-vis liberalization of the European sector and resulting transfer of competency on external 
aviation policy to the Commission. With the European Single Sky (single aviation market), the 
Commission assumed exclusive competency in 2004 to enter into and enforce all future ASAs 
between the EU and third countries, as well as to investigate existing agreements.252 Prior to this, 
Member States drafted, negotiated, and enforced ASAs for their sovereign airspace.253 In the 
wake of the CJEU’s open skies judgments, the Council granted the Commission a mandate to 
open negotiations with third countries over the replacement of certain provisions of existing 
ASAs and exclusive (external) competence vis-à-vis authority to negotiate new comprehensive 
ASAs.254 
A potential further difficulty has arisen in the years since 2004, insofar as the Commission 
simultaneously applied the competition rules to the airline sector and yet, though this next 
 
248 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172. 
249 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, IATA Agrees to End the Joint Setting of Cargo Rates Within 
the EEA (Oct. 19, 2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-1433_en.htm. 
250 See id. 
251 See, e.g., U.K.–India 1951 ASA, supra note 219. 
252 See Council Regulation 549/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 96) 2. 
253 See Achard, supra note 134, at 17. 
254 See Council Decision 11323/03, 2003, partially declassified version available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st11/st11323-ex01.en03.pdf (restricted document 
known as the “Horizontal Mandate”). 
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statement is debatable, appears to have neglected to exercise its exclusive competence to review 
and renegotiate those comprehensive ASAs with third countries, which compelled airlines to 
collaborate on tariffs. 
E.  Conclusions 
Below are general conclusions on what is or what should be considered the “general 
regulatory environment” in which EU airlines operate. Over the period of infringement, four 
possible (and by no means mutually exclusive) eventualities are apparent: 
1) Airlines were compelled by the ASAs to consult each other and form common cargo 
tariffs despite the fact that the practice breached competition rules, giving rise both to 
the 15% reduction in fines and the state action defense. 
2) Airlines hold ultimate responsibility (self-regulation) for ensuring their activities are 
compatible with the EU competition rules. In short, airlines must not prevent, distort, 
or restrict competition. 
3) The Commission’s position was unclear insofar as having only drawn attention to the 
importance of not restricting air cargo competition on intra-EEA routes in 2001; the 
Commission failed to clarify the application of the competition rules to non-EEA 
routes.255 This led to a confusing state of policy. 
4) The Commission undertook to ensure the insertion of the “Community” (now EU) 
airline designation into existing bilateral ASAs between Member States and third 
countries (e.g. Singapore, India, South Korea, and Japan), but it has not yet 
renegotiated multilateral ASAs with all third countries. The EU common external 
aviation policy started in 2003.256 The Commission has since proposed to launch 
“targeted negotiations seeking to achieve global agreements in the major regions of the 
world, with the aim of . . . ensuring fair competition.”257 Thus, the Commission has a 
systematic program for undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of ASAs between 
the EU and third countries that will then replace the existing bilateral ASAs between 
Member States and those countries. In the meantime, however, existing bilateral ASAs 
remain in force. Compounded by considerable variations in these ASAs, it is argued 
that this environment exposed, and possibly continues to expose, airlines to a 
 
255 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172. 
256 External Aviation Policy – Horizontal Agreements, Eur. Comm’n, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/external_aviation_policy/horizonta
l_agreements_en.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2013). 
257 Council Conclusions on Developing the Agenda for the Community’s External Aviation 
Policy, supra note 170, at 11. 
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“patchwork of air service agreements” between the EU and third countries.258 
Regulation 847/2004 provides that “[a]ll existing bilateral agreements between Member States 
and third countries that contain provisions contrary to Community law should be amended or 
replaced by new agreements that are wholly compatible with Community law.”259 What is 
unclear is where responsibility ultimately falls for identifying incompatibilities and initiating 
change.260 The Regulation goes on to say: “Without prejudice to the Treaty, and in particular 
Article 300 thereof, Member States may wish to make amendments to existing agreements and 
make provision to manage their implementation until such time as an agreement concluded by 
the Community enters into force.”261 
It appears from the above statements that while contrary provisions “should be amended or 
replaced,” the Commission has exclusive external competence, and therefore there is no 
requirement for Member States to amend incompatible features of existing bilateral ASAs.262 
Indeed, until the EU targets a particular third country for negotiation of a new multilateral 
agreement, Member States “may wish to make amendments” to existing ASAs, but merely on 
behalf of, and strictly upon notification to, the Commission.263 What results is regulatory lag in 
the European air transport sector. 
In other words, until the EU prioritizes a third country and secures a new comprehensive 
multilateral,264 lacunae such as those that could encourage price coordination will continue to 
 
258 See Martin Bartlik, The Impact of EU Law on the Regulation of International Air 
Transportation 114 (2007). 
259 Council Regulation 847/2004, supra note 15, at 7, 9. 
260 Id. According to Article 4(3) of the TFEU, although the EU has competence to carry out 
activities in research, technological development, and space, Member States are not prevented 
from exercising their competence. TFEU, supra note 22, art. 4. Article 4(2) of the TFEU 
provides that the EU and Member States shall share competence in areas such as transport. Id. It 
is important to note that the European Parliament and the Council may promulgate legislative 
provisions for air transport under Article 100(2) of the TFEU. Id. art. 100. Thus, exercise of EU 
competence requires a specific mandate. See id. arts. 4, 100. 
261 Regulation 847/2004, supra note 15, at 9. 
262 Id. (emphasis added). 
263 Id. 
264 Proposals for a Council Decision regarding the signature on behalf of the EU of provisional 
agreements with third countries is also an (interim) possibility, particularly “where compliance 
with the law of the [EU] should be ensured through amending or complementing existing 
provisions in bilateral air services agreements between Member States and third countries.” See 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the Signature, on Behalf of the European Union, and 
Provisional Application of the Agreement on Certain Aspects of Air Services Between the 
European Union and the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China, at 2, COM (2012) 28 final (Feb. 2, 2012). 
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contribute to a general regulatory environment deserving of either a discount on fines or even an 
annulment of the infringement decision. 
V.  AFTERTHOUGHTS 
This article has given an overview of the legal framework within which the fine was imposed 
and the 15% reduction for the “general regulatory environment” was applied in the 
Commission’s decision in the Airfreight case. It has been observed that in the airline industry 
(where, for most of the EU’s history, collaboration and cooperation between airlines when 
setting tariffs was exempted from competition law), cooperation between airlines is often 
considered inherent because of the need for interlining. The most significant feature affecting the 
application of the mitigation is the operation of various ASAs, and their effect has been 
considered by using the example of the U.K.–third country ASAs in operation at the time of the 
infringements. 
It is hoped that a final version of the Commission’s decision will be made public. It is the 
authors’ further hope that the published version will clarify what “the general regulatory 
environment” in the context of this infringement means. While access to the Commission’s 
confidential file might remain difficult, what one can be sure of at this point, owing to the 
grounds for appeal, is that the ASAs between Member States and third countries are a significant 
element. The authors have sought in this article to interpret the possible grounds of mitigation in 
the “general regulatory environment.” It may be that the ASAs are the only ground for the 
mitigation. But it is also possible that though the airlines are appealing how the requirements 
imposed by these ASAs are considered by the Commission (both when determining that there 
has been an infringement and when setting the fine), other factors in the regulatory environment, 
such as cargo alliances, are relevant, too. In any case, if the ASAs are the only ground for the 
application of the mitigation, it is interesting that it has been applied to all airlines, irrespective of 
which flight routes they operated and therefore irrespective of the extent to which their 
operations fell within the various ASAs. 
While the consensus view is that the Commission often exercises great discretion in issuing 
fines for breaches of the EU competition rules, in the Airfreight decision the Commission’s 
reduction of the fine for all participants with respect to “the general regulatory environment” 
appears to be quite novel. This is particularly interesting because the discretion was exercised 
with respect to the aviation sector, which has “enjoyed” the rather special treatment competition 
authorities have given it, especially in the past. According to the Commission, the regulatory 
environment can be seen as encouraging price coordination; whether it goes so far as to impose 
it, as some airlines argue, is a question yet unanswered. 
